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The reasons why small business development has been disappointing in Russia compared with 
other transition countries such as Poland and the Czech Republic are here analyzed.  It is, 
however, suggested that the picture may not be so gloomy as official statistics suggest. As far 
as St. Petersburg is concerned, it has witnessed an exceptional - by Russian standards - growth 
in this sector in the 1990s, although it still trails compared with Moscow. This, despite the lack 
of support from the local administration and despite having an income per capita close to the 
Russian average. Again official data may be at fault through undervaluing the importance of 
the small business sector in the early 1990s.  
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Non-technical summary 
 
The paper is about the development of small business in Russia with a focus on St. Petersburg. 
When analyzing small business it is necessary to take into consideration that the limitations in 
the Russian definition of small business make the figures not fully comparable with those from 
other countries. The contribution of this sector is, therefore, understated. Moreover, any 
analysis on this sector is hindered by questions over the reliability of the official data. 
Therefore, we can not take for granted that the apparent stagnation in the small business sector 
is a real occurrence, considering the persistent growth of registered businesses which by 1999 
were three and half times as many as the number of small businesses (the figures provided by 
Goskomstat regarding the total number of small firms refer only to active enterprises). Is the 
difference entirely attributable to non-active firms or is Goskomstat (the official statistical 
body) under-estimating this sector? A clue indicating a possible under-estimation comes from a 
survey carried out by Clarke and Kabalina, which points to a continuous growth of the new 
private sector share of total employment in the 1990s.  It is, however, clear that in Russia the 
growth of small business has been slower compared with the leading transition countries 
(Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary). In Poland, and to a lesser degree in the Czech 
Republic, this sector has been the engine of the economic recovery. A natural question is why 
Russia differs. Apart from the fact that in contrast to these countries Russia does not have an 
entrepreneurial tradition and has experienced communist rule longer what is especially 
distinctive about Russia has been the strong influence of interest groups during the transition 
process which favored the allocation of entrepreneurship to largely unproductive activities. The 
following factors which have stifled small business creation and resulted in a very high failure 
rate can in part be attributed to the above-mentioned phenomenon: the business-unfriendly 
legislative framework characterized by the lack of clear rules; the income inequality; the high 
level of corruption and crime; the unpredictable economic environment; the scarcity of 
financing and the precarious state of large industrial firms.  
 
By Russian standards, St. Petersburg has experienced a exceptional growth in the small 
business sector, even if its level is still below Moscow.  However, it may be presumed  that 
data referring to the early 1990s underestimates the contribution of small business in St. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 439 
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Petersburg, especially regarding retail trade and public catering firms. The expansion has taken 
place despite the fact that the business environment in St. Petersburg does not differ from that 
in Russia in general and income per capita is close to the Russian average. This is in contrast to 
Moscow where the expansion of small businesses can be ascribed to much higher income 
levels and to the active promotion of the local administration.  In St. Petersburg the local 
administration has not been particularly business-friendly, dispensing favors to its “cronies” 
and doing little to rein in bureaucratic abuses. Policy making in industry has been centered, in 
particular, on helping certain sectors deemed as priorities, but the efficacy of these measures is 
doubtful at best.  Economic policies in St. Petersburg may be seen as being shaped by the 
mentality of a planned economy, reflected in the drafting of countless plans and measures, 
which have, however, largely remained unrealized. Little has, instead, been done to meet the 
demands of small businesses. In trying to explain why small business has performed so well in 
St. Petersburg a few reasons can be suggested. The higher educational level compared with 
Russia as a whole and the “Western mentality” of the population has represented a fertile 
environment for the emergence of entrepreneurship. The expansion of the small business sector 
has been boosted by the much larger retail spending per head than in Russia as a whole due a 
variety of factors (the presence of a relatively large middle class - by Russian standards - the 
comparatively large foreign community and the tourist industry). This explains why growth has 
been particularly strong in the service sector. On the contrary, despite the wealth of scientific 
knowledge in the city, scientific firms have not developed to any great extent.  
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Introduction 
 
Small business in Russia has not fulfilled expectations, either in the late Soviet period or since 
the communist downfall. Legalized in the second half of the eighties when the Soviet Union 
was still in place to improve the availability of goods which were in short supply, it was 
initially expected to function within a system which was to remain largely planned. Instead, it 
might have exacerbated the scarcity of these goods and, by making the internal contradictions 
more evident, accelerated the fall of socialism. Similarly, the economic transition in Russia has 
been characterized by the limited development of small business which has been particularly 
disappointing when compared with the leading transition countries, especially Poland and the 
Czech Republic. Poland had 2,000,000 small firms in 1997
1. The newly established private 
sector has been the main force behind the economic recovery and has led to a strong growth in 
the manufacturing sector in Poland (although growth has been slower than in services). By the 
late nineties, SMEs accounted for two-third of GDP and more than half of manufacturing 
output according to Gomulka
2 (Meth-Cohn, 1999), Even in the Czech Republic, growth has 
been strongest in small industrial firms, while the contribution of large industrial enterprises 
has decreased (Borish and Noel, 1996). The share of the former in total industrial production 
has increased from 3.8% in 1991 to 22.6% in 1997 (Bohata and Mladek, 1998).  The evidence 
from Hungary suggests that the industrial restructuring can be largely ascribed to foreign 
investment. However, small business accounted for 30-35% of GDP as early as 1994 and its 
share of the economy was on the increase (The Delegation of Hungary, 1996). The growth in 
small business in these countries seems to have been an organic process, once economic 
deregulation had been conceded, as policy making has devoted little attention to the emergence 
of entrepreneurship despite the key role it was supposed to play in the economic transition. A 
natural question, therefore, is why Russia differs. 
 
                                                           
1 The definition of small firm is not, however, uniform across all the transition countries. Statistical bodies in 
Poland define a small firm as having fewer than six employees and a medium-scale firm as one with 6-50 
employees, so the terms small and medium firms broadly correspond to the Russian definition of small firms.  
Poland’s figure probably refers to small and medium-sized companies, as defined by Polish statistical bodies. 
2 Gomulka is a well known economist who has also served as an advisor to the Polish Finance Ministry. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 439 
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I have chosen to focus in particular on St. Petersburg because it seemed to be one of the most 
appropriate places where small business could progress in Russia. St. Petersburg represents the 
most European part of Russia with a highly-educated population.  It is a leading industrial 
center with a high share of high-technology industries, most of which formerly belonged to the 
military industrial complex.  Several international programs to promote entrepreneurship have 
been established in St. Petersburg. It is also one of the most liberal cities in Russia, having 
always returned pro-reform majorities since the first free elections in the early nineties.  Even 
in Soviet times the city had a tradition of being strongly reformist and tried to follow its own 
path of development. Since the 1950s specific programs were devised by local authorities to 
foster innovation in industry.  For these reasons it is reasonable to expect that economic 
reforms would take root more easily in St. Petersburg compared with the rest of the Russian 
Federation, and consequently create a favorable environment for the development of 
entrepreneurship.  
 
Qualitative in-depth interviews were conducted in order to obtain a first-hand account of the 
business environment within which small businesses operate. The fieldwork was conducted in 
the period August 1997-October 1998. In total, more than 40 people were interviewed, of 
which seven were entrepreneurs and the rest were representatives of entrepreneurial 
associations, foreign firms, research institutes, the Academy of Science, foreign and Russian 
organisations promoting small business and also university professors and members of the 
local administration. Not all are reported in the study, but nevertheless most provided useful 
feedback. All entrepreneurs but one were involved in manufacturing.  This was a deliberate 
choice because it is the development of manufacturing firms which plays the most important 
role for economic growth. The multiplier benefits of an expansion in the manufacturing sector 
are likely to be greater than those of a similar growth in service sector activity (Fothergill and 
Gudgin, 1982; Smallbone and other, 1997).  Dertouzoz, Lester and Solow (1989) argue that 
despite the obvious transformation of economic activity from manufacturing into services, 
manufacturing remains the cornerstone of a modern industrial economy. 
 
1. Factors which have led to a slower development of small business in Russia compared 
to the leading transition countries: an analysis William Davidson Institute Working Paper 439 
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Mainstream small business theory can be of only partial help given the particular conditions of 
the transition from a planned to a market economy. Entrepreneurs’ personalities in Russia have 
been found to be quite similar to those in advanced market economies (Ageev, Gratchev and 
Hisrich, 1995; Kuznetsov McDonald and Kuznetsova, 2000) and the system of cultural values, 
which came into being in the last decade, is very sympathetic to entrepreneurship. Sociological 
studies have shown a rather positive attitude of the population towards private enterprises 
(Kuczi and Lengyei, 1995; Radaev, 1993; Blinov, 1998). Shiller, Boyko and Korobov (1991) 
found Russians favorably inclined towards markets, in similar proportions to the populations of 
the United States, Germany and Japan.  Research has shown that an abrupt shift in values has 
taken place since the beginning of perestroika. This has resulted in entrepreneurship being 
considered highly prestigious. The main reasons for the poor development in Russia put 
forward in this paper are the following: 
•   historical reasons which contributes to the lack of entrepreneurial culture 
•   Olson’s theory about the existence of strong interest groups which shares common 
ground with Baumol’s theory on relative rewards for different types of economic activity. 
 
The first explanation suggests that Russian entrepreneurs have less experience than their 
Eastern counterparts and therefore less developed business skills. This is because, unlike 
Russia, there was in the leading transition countries a strong entrepreneurial sector before the 
communist take-over, because communism lasted for slightly more than forty years instead of 
more than seventy and because domestic firms had more interrelations with Western 
counterparts. In addition, in two of these countries (Poland and Hungary) some entrepreneurial 
activity was allowed. The result is that key business skills are alien to Russian entrepreneurs 
and it will take a while before they are able to acquire these. Russian entrepreneurs may be 
highly qualified, but feel themselves lacking proper management and business knowledge 
(Babaeva and Lapina, 1997).  For this reason, even if the new favorable attitudes to 
entrepreneurship have encouraged the creation of new firms, failure rates have been extremely 
high. 
 William Davidson Institute Working Paper 439 
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Olson’s (1982) contention that the existence of strong special interest groups in a country 
limits its ability to adopt new technologies and reallocate resources as a result of changing 
conditions is particularly relevant in Russia where the strong power of interest groups has led 
to the concession of extremely favorable conditions for well-connected individuals and has 
strongly influenced economic policy. This contrasts starkly with the leading transition 
countries, where the political leadership has been largely replaced, domestic policy has been 
less dominated by vested interests and “rules of the game” have been more clear and more fair. 
As a result of this, the relative rewards for different types of economic activity have favored 
the allocation of entrepreneurship to largely unproductive activities, such as rent seeking and 
organized crime, rather than to productive activities. 
 
The phenomena described above can, to a greater or lesser extent, be identified as having given 
rise to the following six conditions, which have had a much greater impact in Russia, than in 
the leading transition countries, and have acted as a constraint to small business development: 
1.  high levels of corruption 
2.  strong income inequality 
3.  a business-unfriendly legislative framework and the general situation of instability 
caused by the lack of clear rules 
4.  the scarcity of financing for small businesses 
5.  the precarious state of large industrial enterprises 
6.  a high level of crime. 
 
1.  Corruption is one of the main factors indicated by the entrepreneurial class which 
adversely affects their activity. Russia has become one of the most corrupt countries in 
the world in the nineties. It came 47th out of fifty-four countries analyzed by the 
University of Gottingen (Business Eastern Europe, 1996).  Similar conclusions have 
been reached by the Economist Intelligence Unit and by the DRI/McGraw Hill Risk 
Service (EBRD, 1997). This phenomenon was not so acute in the 1980s, when its 
incidence was lower than in some East European countries (Business Eastern Europe, 
1996). As the higher echelons of power have been guilty of one form of corruption or 
another in the eyes of the population and asset grabbing has been going on practically William Davidson Institute Working Paper 439 
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unchecked, the behavior of those in power has been replicated by lower levels of the 
bureaucratic structure. The poor salaries of state employees has also acted as a moral 
justification for their behavior. 
 
2.  Income inequality has passed from being very moderate at the beginning of the decade 
to becoming one of the highest in the world while the variation has not been substantial 
in countries such Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic (Milanovic, 1998). The 
large increase in income inequality has been particularly damaging because the new 
rich have indulged in conspicuous consumption and saved their wealth abroad, without 
investing in the domestic economy. The existence of a middle class with the financial 
resources to engage in entrepreneurial activity is still marginal, except in Moscow, St. 
Petersburg and few other cities. At the same time the poorer classes hardest hit by the 
transition have been hardly able to afford education, resulting in decreased educational 
attainment. 
 
3.  A complex yet deficient legislative framework is one of the features which has 
characterized the poorly performing transition countries in relation to the leading 
transition countries. In Russia the legal framework is characterized by an obstructive 
regulatory regime, high taxation and conflicting and convoluted legislation. Since 
taxation takes away about 80% of a company’s profits the entrepreneur is left with no 
other option than carrying out a significant proportion of a firm’s activities in the non-
regulated sector. Opening and managing a business is more complicated and subject to 
greater bureaucratic interference than in Poland (Schleifer, 1997).  Comparisons with 
the Czech Republic and Hungary are likely to be equally unfavorable to Russia. In 
Russia a clear delimitation of power among the bodies which can enact legislation is 
lacking. The result is an array of conflicting rules, making it impossible for an 
entrepreneur to follow the law. The entrepreneur is, therefore, subject to the whims of 
the supervising bodies. As emphasized by some leading authorities
3, favored groups 
                                                           
3 Orlov, president of the Academy of Economics, argued that the state policy towards small business is in effect 
aimed at increasing state revenues and providing financial benefits for state bureaucrats, since the maze of 
regulations invites bribery (Nelson and Kuzes, 1995). Kivelidi, the director of the Council on Entrepreneurship, 
an independent think tank established by a Yeltsin decree, asserted that entrepreneurship seemed for the William Davidson Institute Working Paper 439 
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might have had an interest in avoiding the implementation of a  clear legal and tax 
framework, as their business dealings have been conducted on the fringe of the law and 
in order to prevent the emergence of new economic actors who could challenge their 
dominance, but no conclusive evidence can be provided on this point. It might also be 
argued that this is the result of the fact that historically there has been little respect for 
the rule of law in Russia. Whatever the reason, probably a combination of these two 
factors, after almost a decade, legislation seems to serve the purpose of discouraging 
business, rather than providing a framework in which it can prosper. The Russian tax 
system favors consumption over investment, being particularly punitive on 
manufacturing activities, and is therefore a serious impediment to growth. 
Simplification of taxation had been on the agenda for many years, but it was only with 
the enactment of the first and the second part of the new tax code in 1999 and 2000 that 
it was partially achieved.  
 
4.  Financing for small business has been extremely scarce. The banking sector is much 
smaller than in the leading transition countries and a very high proportion of domestic 
credit goes to the government and public enterprises (Russian Economic Trends, 
October 1997). Banks have been very cautious in financing small businesses, especially 
new start-ups which are considered too risky, given their high failure rate. Part of the 
blame lies with the state policy which encouraged the banks to invest in state bonds, 
instead of in the real sector. Then, the state-induced collapse of the banking system in 
1998 led to a dramatic decrease in the amount of credit going to small businesses. State 
programs intended to develop small business have also remained largely unfulfilled, 
fueling doubts as to whether there is a real intention to promote it. Worse still, the 
limited resources allocated to the Federal Fund for Small Business Support were mostly 
mis-spent. In total about 90% of  the resources received from the state were not utilized 
correctly (Sokolovskaia, 1998).  It can be concluded that the abolition of the State 
Committee for the Support and Promotion of Entrepreneurship in late 1998 has, 
therefore, not been greatly regretted by the entrepreneurial class. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
government only “an abstract idea and even dangerous. It is a threat to their existence” (Nelson and  Kuzes, 
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5.  Because of the larger output decline, industrial enterprises are in a worse condition in 
Russia than in the leading transition countries. Privatization has not led to a significant 
restructuring. One reason put forward is that privatization has not brought about a high 
degree of management turnover, e.g., as in the Czech Republic, thus leaving in place 
the old management regardless of their business skills. However, the state of industry 
can not only be attributed to poor skills of managerial staff. Industrial firms in Russia 
are penalized both by a punitive taxation system and high utility prices, as well as 
having to survive while receiving less than half of the revenues in non-cash form for 
most of the 1990s. The payment crisis which has arisen means that in 1997 an 
enterprise received on average less than 20% of its sale revenues in cash, rather than in 
non-monetary forms of payment. The rest was composed of veksels (promissory notes), 
mutual off-sets and barter operations (Russian Economic Trends, 1998, no. 1). The 
share of revenues represented by cash has subsequently risen to 35% in August 1998, 
49% in February 1999 and two-thirds one year later. (Russian Economic Trends, 2000, 
n. 4; Russian Economic Trends, May 1999; Bofit, 2000). In some cases they are also 
bankrupted by the opportunistic behavior of the management who strip them of their 
assets for personal gain or intentionally cause bankruptcy in order to buy the firm 
cheaply. Adding to all this the depressed level of demand, it is, therefore, very hard for 
enterprises to prosper.  In other East European countries the role of large enterprises has 
been instrumental in fostering the expansion of small enterprise networks; but in Russia 
the poor economic condition of most large enterprises has meant that a  major sales 
outlet for small businesses is almost absent. While, for example, in Slovenia many 
small industrial firms were suppliers of large establishments (Bartlett and Prasnikar, 
1995), this option was scarcely available in Russia. 
 
6.  The payment of protection money is more widespread in Russia than in Poland or the 
Czech Republic (Shleifer, 1997), but the constraint that racketeering evidently places 
on business activity has not been ranked among the foremost of problems identified by 
entrepreneurs (Chepurenko, Avilova and Pripisnov, 1995; Radaev and others, 1995; 
Voprosy Statistiki, 1995; Leontief Center, 1998). One reason for this may be a William Davidson Institute Working Paper 439 
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reluctance to discuss protection rackets, which makes any assessment of their effects 
difficult, but studies have generally considered the effects of racketeering a less 
pressing difficulty than those associated with complying with complex and 
contradictory legislation (Babaeva and Lapina, 1997; Zhuravskaya, 1998; Blinov, 
1996). 
 
The absence of supporting networks is another reason which can be adduced for the slow 
growth of small businesses in Russia, although on this point we do not have enough evidence 
to confirm that the situation is worse than in the leading transition countries. The importance of 
networks is well documented in the economic literature (Brunner, 1993; Porter, 1990). In 
Russia, given the economic turmoil and the underdevelopment of market institutions, networks 
are likely to play an even greater role, a fact which has been highlighted by several studies 
(Kuznetsov McDonald and Kuznetsova, 2000; Neace, 1999).   These networks facilitate high 
trust relationships, thereby cutting transaction costs.  However up to now, formal networks 
have played a very limited role in fostering entrepreneurship in Russia as banks tend to ignore 
new firms, consulting is mostly unaffordable and business associations reach a limited number 
of entrepreneurs. According to a research carried out by the Leontief Center (1999), 94% of 
entrepreneurs are not members of any association.   Informal networks are also poorly 
developed. The average entrepreneur tends to be isolated
4. The most relevant network is 
formed by the former communist nomenklatura, which is the group largely reaping the benefits 
of transition, while for new entrepreneurs with few connections building a network of trusted 
partners will take time as trust usually evolves slowly. 
 
2. Statistical analysis of small business development 
 
Assessing the level of development of small business in St. Petersburg and in Russia as a 
whole requires a critical analysis of official statistics, due to the existence of several 
inconsistencies. In the opinion of the Institute for Private Sector Development and Strategic 
                                                           
4 Webster and Charap (1993) found in 1992 that entrepreneurs in St. Petersburg tended to be isolated from each 
other, from the state sector and from the outside world.  This fact has also been emphasized by Pechatnikov, the 
director of a Business Development Center,  in a recent  article in a St. Petersburg newspaper (Belenkova, 1999).  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 439 
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Analysis (IPSSA, 1997), one of the major research centers on small business in Russia, the 
current statistical methods give only an approximate indication of the trend of small business 
development, rather than the true size of this sector. Statistical data are sometimes 
controversial and the method of recalculation used is not clear. Goskomstat’s statisticians 
themselves admit that the system of collecting and analyzing statistical data does not allow 
them to follow with due precision developments in the private sector of the Russian economy 
(Alimova and others, 1998). On occasion national and regional offices of Goskomstat have 
provided two different sets of data on small business in the same region, as data sent to the 
headquarters in Moscow are recalculated  using their own methods.  For example, in the 
Tomsk region the number of small enterprises was estimated to be 4,356 in October 1995 by 
the regional branch of Goskomstat, while the official statistics of the Russian Federation 
indicate figures of 5,673 and 5,176 in June and December 1995 respectively (Radaev, 1997).  
The difference of 15-25%, depending on the month referred to, is quite significant. In addition, 
the frequent changes in the methodology make it difficult to compare the data across the 
period. The small business share of total employment was only 13% in 1999
5 in Russia, 
compared to an SME share of two-thirds in the EU (OECD, 2000; Russian SME Resource 
Center, 2000). It must be taken into account that Russian and Western official data on small 
business are not fully comparable, as the Russian definition of small business has several 
limitations
6. For this reason the contribution of this sector to the economy is understated.  A 
question mark hangs over the apparent stagnation of the number of small businesses since 
1994, considering the continuous growth of registered enterprises (the figures provided by 
Goskomstat regarding the total number of small firms refer only to active enterprises).  Is this 
only an effect of the non-liquidation of inactive enterprises or is Goskomstat underestimating 
their numbers? Unfortunately there is very little evidence on this point.  
 
                                                           
5 Yearly figures as of 31
st December. 
6   The definitions stated in the state program approved in 1995 are: 
•   the share of charter capital belonging to legal entities which are not small businesses, to state, religious, 
social and charitable organizations and other foundations must be lower than 25% (previously there was no 
limit concerning statutory capital). 
•   a maximum of 100 employees in industry, transport and construction (previously 200 by law), 60 in science, 
scientific services and agriculture (previously 100), 50 in wholesale trade, 30 in retail trade/public catering 
and consumer services (previously 15) and 50 in other spheres of activity (previously 50 for other sectors of William Davidson Institute Working Paper 439 
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In contrast to official statistics other sources give a much more positive picture of this sector. 
Babaeva and Lapina (1997) estimate the total number of small business employees at twenty 
million in 1995, that is to say one-third of the labor force, including those who are officially 
employed in state firms or unemployed, but who are really engaged in small business activity 
instead. According to data from a survey carried out in five Russian cities, the share of new 
private firms in total employment was 18.4% in 1998, or 20.6%, including secondary 
employment, which is mostly unregistered. Also adding self-employment it would be 22.5% 
(Clarke and Kabalina, 1999). They found this share to have posted a continuous growth since 
1987.  What is puzzling is that growth became steadier after 1994 when officially the small 
business sector stopped growing. According to their data the majority of people employed by 
these new enterprises are employed by firms which fit the definition of small businesses.  So, 
there are reasons to believe that that the small business contribution has not been fully captured 
in official statistics.   
 
Although there are no official data on survival rates, small businesses in Russia seem to be 
characterized by an extremely short life-span (Holtmann, 1997; Polonsky, 1998). Many firms 
were created in the enthusiasm of the new opportunities arising from the transformation of the 
economic system, but often lacked a clear market analysis and therefore could not survive 
long. The low output per firm - slightly more than $6,000 per year in 1997 (Russian SME 
Resource Centre, 1998) - testifies to the low development stage reached by most firms. Even 
taking into account the fact that Goskomstat does not capture the grey economy in its figures - 
surveys and experts’ estimates suggest that this is around 30-40% in the small business sector 
(studies reported by IPSSA, 1998), the picture does not change substantially. A critical aspect 
of small business support is, therefore, not only to increase creation rates, but also to assist 
existing firms to survive and prosper. Conflicting survey results do not give a clear indication 
as to how small businesses are faring, but the prevalent picture has not been very favorable for 
industrial firms, while for trading firms the picture is mixed (OECD, 1997; Avilova  and 
others, 1997; Vasil’chuk, 1997; Deikin, 1998). However, the rouble devaluation of August 
1998 has altered the picture in some industrial sectors. Output in small industrial enterprises 
increased by 61.8% in the course of 1999 as domestic producers have benefited from the steep 
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price increase in foreign goods and from a change in the population’s perception of domestic 
goods (Alimova and Ermilova, 2000).  
 
3. How small business is faring in St. Petersburg 
 
The majority of the firms covered in the interviews (all industrial firms, but one)
7 remain in a 
very precarious financial position. They do not generate enough circulating capital to make any 
investment and have to utilise old and outdated equipment. Nor can they earmark enough 
financial resources to advertise their products, while often having to compete with foreign 
firms which can afford a much larger advertising budget. No figures were given as to 
profitability, but all complained that production is hardly profitable. However, Russian 
entrepreneurs might exaggerate their economic plight because they want to attract as little 
attention as possible.  They tend to be very secretive when asked about these kinds of data. 
From these interviews it seems that the better-performing firms are those selling directly to 
consumers or retail outlets, while those selling to industries or budget-financed institutions 
have great difficulties surviving.  However, even for the former, the limited purchasing power 
of the population acts as a major  stumbling block to their expansion. Among the entrepreneurs 
there is a palpable resentment towards Moscow, which in their opinion enjoys a much higher 
standard of living at the expense of the rest of Russia. A constant remark is that 70-80% of the 
financial resources of the country are concentrated in Moscow
8.  
 
The interviews carried out have highlighted how the success of a business is connected to a 
variety of factors which make the business environment unpredictable. One firm (BMN) is 
resigned to having lost a substantial amount of money because a major bank of St. Petersburg, 
                                                           
7 Interviews were carried out with: 
  T. B., general director of Fitolon, a pharmaceutical company created in 1992. 
  E. C., general director of Melp, a firm created in 1993 which produces medical equipment. 
  S. H., general manager of Slavia, a publishing house, set up in October 1990. 
  O.L., general director of Acvasviaz, a company set up in 1991 which develops and produces anti-theft devices 
and anti-fire equipment. 
  M. M., general director of Gefest, a furniture producing firm created in 1988. 
  T. P., director of BMN Peterburg, an advertising agency created in 1992. 
  E. R., chief accountant of R. (the interviewee requested the name of the firm not be published), a firm set up in 
1991 to develop and produce remote-controlled mechanical systems for x-ray and optical applications. 
8 Confirmation of this can be found also in academic literature (Pimoshenko 1996: 54). William Davidson Institute Working Paper 439 
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one of its clients, on behalf of which it had anticipated the payment of advertising, found itself 
in financial difficulties and is unlikely to pay back the debt
9, another firm (Acvasviaz) was 
almost bankrupted at the beginning of its activity because a state institution could not pay for 
what it had ordered, not having received the funds from the budget, the market niche targeted 
by a third company (Melp) disappeared in 1995-1996 after a few years of work because 
industrial clients no longer had the resources to spend on the ecological treatment of water and, 
according to the company’s director, resorted to throwing water away without cleaning it, 
despite this being illegal. For this reason this firm turned to the production of medical 
equipment.  The problem of the lack of compliance with the law also seriously affects 
Acvasviaz which has a potentially large market, as the installation of anti-fire equipment is 
compulsory.  However,  few firms can currently afford to abide by the law, since most Russian 
industries are in a very bad economic condition, and for this reason resort to bribing inspectors 
rather than complying with the regulations.  
 
Because of the considerable swings in the level of market demand and the unpredictability of 
the environment firms tend to have a very flexible employment structure. Staff is usually 
reduced to a minimum, usually just administrative personnel, while industrial workers are 
employed only where there is an order. Alternatively, the work is contracted out to a larger 
factory where, usually, the problem is the converse: a surplus of workers.  Other major 
problems encountered by these entrepreneurs are the continuous inspection by the tax and 
other departments, which can block a firm’s activity; the freezing of a firm’s bank account by 
tax bodies without warning; fraud, against which legislation offers little protection; a tax 
burden which makes non-compliance a necessity in order to survive; the onerous accounting 
procedures; the difficulties in obtaining outside financing; the lack of an effective patent law 
which can be enforced against imitators, the lack of domestic suppliers capable of meeting 
their requirements and in some cases the perceived inferiority of Russian products by the 
population. It seems that Russian consumers, who used to have a very low opinion of domestic 
products, now have a higher regard for domestic goods, which are not necessarily thought 
worse than foreign equivalents, according to a recent survey carried out by the Stockholm 
School of Economics in St. Petersburg  (Shcherbakova, 1999: 9). In sophisticated goods such 
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as household appliances, a Russian brand can, however, still be an handicap, as also indicated 
in the same survey
10. The penetration of foreign products reached its peak in 1995 when, 
according to official data, they accounted for 54% (Russian Economic Trends, 1999, no.1) of 
retail sales. Since then, a counter trend has developed so that by the year 2000 foreign goods 
accounted for only 34% of retail sales (Russian Economic Trends, 2000, no. 4).  
 
4. Economic policy in St. Petersburg 
 
St. Petersburg has experienced the problems typical of defence-related cities. Few of the major 
military factories have been able to restructure and re-orient production and this has not been 
helped by the chaotic state policy towards conversion. The industrial sector in the city 
witnessed an output drop which was more marked than in Russia in general until 1996. 
However, from 1997 the situation has been reversed, indicating that restructuring is taking 
place, at least in some sectors. A common feature of the years 1992-1996 is that regions 
producing more sophisticated outputs were in a more vulnerable position. The highest rates of 
decline were recorded in the central (including Moscow) and north-west regions (including St. 
Petersburg), which are the most developed parts of Russia, while West and East Siberia, 
regions abundant in natural resources, have suffered much less from de-industrialization.  New 
strategies for the future of the city had, therefore, to be devised in the 1990s as the city lost its 
importance as a defence center, raising fears of a progressive de-industrialization. In the early 
1990s, the transformation of St. Petersburg into a free economic zone with favorable terms for 
foreign investors was expected to lead to an influx of foreign investment. It was hoped, that the 
city would revert to its pre-revolutionary role as a center of international business and finance. 
However, this project, including the concession of tax and customs advantages, failed to bring 
the expected results, and the FEZ strategy was applied only to certain areas. Sobchak, mayor 
from 1991 to 1996, remained committed to the aim of making St. Petersburg an international 
center of business and finance, but the actual results have fallen far short of expectations. 
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In view of the disappointing flow of foreign investment, the new mayor has paid much less 
attention to it, and has declared his main objective to be the restructuring of the industrial 
sector. A Strategic Plan has been devised to set the long-term strategy for the city economy. 
However, the Plan seems to be a collection of differing interest-group recommendations 
without a clear structure and with no apparent strategy for the realization of its aims. A 
common feature of the post-transition years has been the countless plans devised by city 
officials. In the end, however, few of the measures indicated in these plans have been carried 
out. They can be considered more declarations of intent than practical policies. A command 
economy mentality still seems to be prevalent among economic policy makers, but this is also 
the consequence of the disastrous situation in which industry finds itself: this situation acts as 
justification for their involvement. Active involvement to assist the industrial sector is not just 
a characteristic of the local administration of the city, but of most local administrations in 
Russia. Given the precarious situation of most industrial enterprises and the social cost of the 
unemployment that could result from their closure compels the local administration to listen to 
the cry for help of industrial managers. The actual measures implemented for the industrial 
sector in St. Petersburg have been the concession of subsidies to specific businesses, primarily 
in the forms of tax deferments and soft loans, and the reduction of tax rates for specific 
activities. The criteria for the concession of these have, however, not always been clear, and 
nor have the positive results, if any, of this policy. The reason for the improved performance of 
some sectors does not seem to lie with the help they received from the local administration, but 
rather as a result of other factors such as foreign investment and a change in the tastes of 
Russian consumers. The last program devised by Klebanov
11 is more concrete, linking the 
concession of subsidies to restructuring plans which are based on reducing a firms’ size to 
make it more compatible with actual production levels. One of the main features of this 
program is the spinning off of small companies from large enterprises. Experience from the 
Czech Republic shows that the performance of the parent enterprise is generally enhanced once 
non-essential units have been spun off (EBRD, 1998), but as far as St. Petersburg is concerned 
the past results of this process have been mixed. So far this program has been applied to only 
four enterprises and the results have fallen short of expectations. The administration of St. 
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Petersburg has also retained a significant role in promoting co-operation with other members of 
the Federation, signing agreements to exchange locally-made products for the produce of other 
regions in order to assure the city an adequate food supply as market signals are still not 
working properly. 
 
Favoritism has been rife. Despite St. Petersburg being considered a liberal city, mayors have 
behaved like dictators, trying to subdue the legislative assembly and dispensing favors to their 
“cronies”. Entrepreneurs with the right connections have been able to secure more 
advantageous conditions in the forms of: premises at knocked-down prices, either on rent or 
through privatization; city orders; tax deferments; and exemption from inspection. The new 
mayor, Yakovlev, elected in 1996 promised to put finances in order and cut down on 
favoritism. In effect, fiscal management has made huge steps forward. The dramatic situation 
in which the city administration found itself in the early nineties, when the decline in budget 
revenues due to the severe economic crisis was accompanied by a widening of the 
responsibilities that the city had to take on, was finally overcome in the late nineties with a 
balancing of expenditures and revenues. Even if past deficits have left a large debt, St. 
Petersburg was one of the few Russian cities not to default on the repayments of the loans 
granted by foreign bodies. Success in fiscal management has, however, not meant that old 
methods have been eradicated. Municipal tenders are still assigned without proper competition 
and the strong influence of shadowy figures in local government prompted the architect of 
financial stabilization to resign in 1999. 
 
5. Small business growth in St. Petersburg 
 
Despite the economic problems and the fact that the “rules of the game” have not been equal 
for all, St. Petersburg has, nevertheless, experienced a very large growth (by Russian 
standards) of the small business sector since 1992. Even though its level remains lower than in 
Moscow, the growth in the 1990s has been the largest in Russia.  Small business development 
in Russia has been primarily centered in these two cities, where the economic resources to 
sustain small business activity are mainly concentrated. The share of small business in total 
employment in St. Petersburg was 30.4% in 1999 (taking into account permanent full-time William Davidson Institute Working Paper 439 
  18   
workers and contract workers). As a comparison, in Moscow  the analogous percentage was 
34.8% (Goskomstat, 2000).  The much lower unemployment rate in St. Petersburg compared 
with Russia as a whole can be in part attributed to the high level of development achieved by 
this sector in the city. Official unemployment was 1.2% in March 1998. This is 2.3 times lower 
than the analogous figure for the whole of Russia
12 (The Socio-Economic Situation in St. 
Petersburg. A General Overview, 1998, no. 32).  
 
The engine of this growth has been retail trade and public catering firms, which had only a 
minor role at the start of the decade. This is in contrast to that of scientific firms, the role of 
which in the small business sector has progressively waned. In St. Petersburg, the number of 
small businesses grew by more than 11 times between 1992 and 1999, while in Russia the 
increase was a mere 60% and threefold if we consider also the previous year (1991). However, 
data for 1992 are probably underestimated. In 1992 St. Petersburg accounted for just 1.7% of 
all small enterprises in Russia with 3.3% of the Russian population, while in 1999 the 
corresponding share was 12%. Such a low level in 1992 is clearly absurd as small business is 
bound to be more developed in big cities and there is no objective reason why small business 
should lag so far behind in St. Petersburg in 1992. What is especially puzzling is the extremely 
low number of retail trade and public catering firms, considering the fact that in 1990 retail 
trade per capita was almost 30% higher then in the country as a whole (Goskomstat, 1999). 
Their concentration in relation to the population was one-fifth of the Russian average in 1992, 
but by 1999 it was four times bigger. Different privatization policies cannot explain this as 
small privatized firms represent a negligible percentage of the whole number of firms. The 
total number of firms privatized in the city amounted to 3,962 between 1992 and 1996.  
 
This growth has taken place in the absence of a clear policy by the local government to 
promote small business. In Russia, the attitude towards small business has varied greatly 
between different local administrations. These administrations have a strong influence on the 
                                                           
12 However, one must bear in mind that a great number of workers made redundant do not bother to register as 
unemployed because unemployment benefits are extremely low and, therefore, are not included in the statistics. 
Official figures fail also to take into consideration the number of workers who are employed, but are on forced 
vacations, and those on reduced working time. According to the rules of the International Labour Organization William Davidson Institute Working Paper 439 
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business environment: a substantial share of the tax burden is determined by local bodies, as 
well as the rent of premises, the majority of which they own. They also have considerable 
autonomy in implementing regulations. In general, the entrepreneurs interviewed in St. 
Petersburg have been strongly critical of the local administration. The environment is not 
considered to be particularly business-friendly, and almost all the interviewees agree that it has 
not improved during recent years.  The administration is in particular accused of approving 
legislation without exercising the proper competence. The entrepreneurs have, instead, a high 
opinion of the Moscow administration. The resolution of the second congress of the 
entrepreneurs of St. Petersburg in November 1997 also severely criticized the local 
administration  (Predprinimatel’ Peterburga, 1997, no.23). In St. Petersburg financing for 
support measures has been limited and the little financing provided has been usually mis-
managed (Predprinimatel’ Peterburga, 1999, no.13; Shabalina, 1999). Small businesses in St. 
Petersburg do not have political power and have been, therefore, largely ignored by the local 
government until very recently. Only one business association can boast more than 1,000 
members. In more recent times, however, the development of this sector has made it 
impossible for the mayor to ignore it. The mayor, after failing to attend the second congress of 
the Entrepreneurs of St. Petersburg, appeared at the third congress in October 1999, pointing to 
the vast increase in resources earmarked for the small business program for 1998-2000 as proof 
of the dedication of the current administration to the sector.  The program, however, was 
approved by the legislative assembly only in May 2000 and only for that year and the planned 
allocations were reduced by about two-thirds. As usual in the general economic policy of the 
city, various committees have been set up to advise the government and a lot of different 
measures have been proposed, but most have not yet been applied and the specific legislation 
approved in the city has had scarce effect. No concrete effort has been made to ease the main 
problems affecting small businesses in the city (the high cost of premises, the difficulty of 
obtaining loans, the high level of taxation, bureaucratic racketeering, etc.).  The only positive 
steps have the creation of a single licence chamber, the lowering of the profits tax and the 
removal of the tax on educational institutions. However, these tax measures alone have had 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
unemployment was in reality 9.8% in the city by the end of 1996  (City of Saint Petersburg 1996, 1997). In 
addition, many workers, although employed, are not paid. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 439 
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little effect, as the tax burden remains extremely high. The taxes on total revenues are 
especially crippling.  
 
In addition to the lack of support from the administration, St. Petersburg, unlike Moscow, does 
not enjoy a particularly high standard of living, which is only slightly higher than the national 
average. In 1998 the average income in St. Petersburg was 9% higher than in Russia as a 
whole, while in Moscow it was four times as much  (Goskomstat, 1999). As these are usually 
mentioned as the two main factors explaining the expansion of small business in Moscow 
(especially the higher standard of living), it is reasonable to ask what caused small business to 
grow so much in St. Petersburg. One question mark hangs over the reliability of these figures, 
as impressionistic evidence would appear to suggest a substantially higher standard of living in 
St. Petersburg than in the rest of Russia. Apart from this, the factors which may explain the 
great expansion of the small business sector in St. Petersburg are mainly:   
•   The high educational level of the population - the highest in Russia (Lesage and Bayou, 
1993) - and their more “Western mentality” because of their proximity with advanced 
market economy, which makes them more prone to engage in entrepreneurial activity. 
•   The presence of a small, but relevant, by Russian standards, middle class. The population is 
characterized by a higher than in Russia proportion of pensioners with very low incomes, 
which means that there is a sizable share of the population with higher than average 
incomes, who have money to spend on non-essential goods.  
•   Spending in the city economy is boosted by the presence of a sizable foreign community - 
about 12-15,000 people (Economist Intelligence Unit, 1999) -  and a steady influx of 
tourists, as well as inhabitants of the surrounding region (Leningrad Oblast) who work in 
the city. 
 
This explains why retail spending per capita is higher then in Russia as a whole and why small 
business growth has been mainly concentrated in services. Retail trade per capita was 13% to 
50% higher than the average in Russia between 1995 and 1999 (Goskomstat, 2000), However, 
the switch of consumers’ preference to domestic goods in some sectors, after their initial 
curiosity for foreign products, helped by the fact that domestic products are improving their William Davidson Institute Working Paper 439 
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When analyzing small business in Russia two factors have to be taken into consideration: 
•   the limitations of the definition of small business 
•   the question mark over the reliability of the official statistics. 
 
Official figures are not wholly comparable with those of other European countries because of 
the different criteria utilised to define small business and therefore tend to belittle small 
business contribution in Russia. Officially small business in Russia has stagnated after a few 
years of swift development in the early 1990s, remaining at a level which is well below that in 
developed market economies and also in the leading transition countries.  Small business in 
Russia has expanded considerably only in Moscow and St. Petersburg. However, data on the 
total number of enterprises suggest a marked dynamism even in the second half of the nineties. 
The strong increase of this figure is officially due to the fact that many firms which cease 
activity are not liquidated and therefore are kept in the state register, while others never 
become operational. However, the evidence of the survey conducted by Clarke and Kabalina 
seems to suggest that small business growth has been under-estimated. 
 
The unreliability of statistics is called into question also regarding St. Petersburg. The 
phenomenal growth that St. Petersburg has experienced in the 1990s might have been partly 
the consequence of the understatement of the figures in the early 1990s. In St. Petersburg a 
clear commitment from the local administration to promote small business has been absent. So 
far it has done very little to support this sector, merely approving mandatory federal legislation 
and programs for small business support which have,  however, remained largely 
unimplemented. Neither can small business growth be ascribed to the greater concentration of 
wealth as in Moscow since income levels in St. Petersburg are closer to the Russian average. It 
is, however, an open question whether income levels in St. Petersburg reflect reality. Apart 
from this, some other factors can be detected which might plausibly explain the entrepreneurial William Davidson Institute Working Paper 439 
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boom in the city. The higher levels of educational attainment and the more “Western 
mentality” make the citizens of St. Petersburg more prone to engage in entrepreneurial activity. 
In addition, numerous factors (the presence of a relatively large middle class - by Russian 
standards - a comparatively large foreign community and the tourist industry) make retail 
spending per capita in St. Petersburg higher than in Russia as a whole. 
 William Davidson Institute Working Paper 439 
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Vladlena V. Yeliseeva, chief expert of the SME Development Department of the Committee 
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TABLE 1. 
Number of small businesses and total number of firms in Russia 









































%  of A to B  84.9  92.0  69.5  46.1  39.0  33.8  31.6  29.9  28.9
The figures are listed in thousands and refer to the end of each year.  
Sources: Goskomstat, 1998: 342; Statisticheskoe Obozrenie, 1999, no. 3: 19; Goskomstat, 1996: 226; Goskomstat, 





Number of small businesses in St. Petersburg 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996  1997 1998 1999 
9,697 22,695 57,072 68,379 88,238 101,455  111,800  109,700 
Sources: Goskomstat Rossii: St. Petersburg Committee of State Statistics: various editions of Sozial’no- 
ekonomicheskoe  polozhenie Sankt-Peterburga i Leningradskoi oblasti  
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TABLE 3 
Number of small businesses in St. Petersburg divided by sector 
Economic branches:  30/06/92 31/12/92 31/12/93 31/12/94 31/12/95 31/12/96 31/12/97 31/12/98 increase
98/92 
Industry  1,407 1,933 5,384 11,736 10,068 14,218 16,757 19,453 906% 
Agriculture 46  65  281  366 
Transport  and  communication  110 139 523 1,606 1,801 2,128 2,571 3,689 3254% 
Construction  1,190 1,655 4,662 10,601  9,695 13,384 14,160 17,441 1366% 
Retail trade and public catering  846 1,827 5,436 18,176  28,558  36,745  44,775  52,546 6111% 
Material supplies and sales  967  924  806  936   
Information  services  15 119 283 190 254 402 532 447 2881% 
Real estate transactions  99  256  659  854   
General comm. activity to  
support market functioning 
324 682 2,027 3,016 3,011 3,651 3,130 866% 
Other kinds of activity in the  
sphere of material production 
411 208 521 590 724  2,929   
Housing and public utilities; non 
-production services rendered to  
households 
237  585 220    1,789 655% 
Health care, physical culture  
and sport, social security 
197 307 581 1,778 2,162 1,450 2,937 2,795 1319% 
Education  82 144 274 751 880 802  1,104 671 718% 
Culture  and  art  84 125 256 768 1,004 1,068 1,416 1,230 1364% 
Science  and scientific services  1,257 1,803 3,248 5,810 6,879 6,631 6,513 3,242 158% 
Finance, credit, insurance, 
pension security 
 805  1,250     
Other  sectors  348 1,234 1,158 1,996  837 4,459 1,954 5,366 1442% 
Total  6,097 9,697 22,695 57,072 68,379 88,238  101,455  111,800 1734% 
Nota bene: data for some economic branches are not available for every single year 
Sources: Goskomstat Rossii: St. Petersburg Committee of State Statistics: various editions of Sozial’no-
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TABLE 4 
Trends in industrial production in Russia and St. Petersburg 
  1991  1992 1993  1994  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 




 -22.8%     -
4.7% 
  -4.0%    +1.9%    -5.2%  +8.1% 




 -36.1%   -
12.3% 
-20.5%    +9%    -0.3%  +7.8% 
Sources: Russian Economic Trends, 1996, no. 3: 138; Russian Economic Trends, 1999, no. 2: 101-102; Russian 
Economic Trends, 2000, no. 4: 70; Goskomstat, 1999: 300;  St. Petersburg City Administration (no date); 
Goskomstat Rossii: St. Petersburg Committee of State Statistics: various editions of Sozial’no-ekonomicheskoe  
polozhenie Sankt-Peterburga i Leningradskoi oblasti  
 
TABLE 5 
Share of imports in overall retail trade 
  1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Domestic    86    77     71    52    46    48    51     57  70     66 
Imported    14    23     29    48    54    52    49     43  30     34 
Source: Russian Economic Trends, 2000, n. 4: 73. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 439 

























Nota bene: the decrease in 1996 is to be attributed to the change in the criteria used to define small business 
Sources: Goskomstat Rossii: St. Petersburg Committee of State Statistics: various editions of Sozial’no- 
ekonomicheskoe  polozhenie Sankt-Peterburga i Leningradskoi oblasti  
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1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Full-time workers Part-time workers
Contract workers Total no. of workers 
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